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for a Future Together
Naomi Norberg*
Introduction
What is the relationship between terrorism and international criminal law? More
precisely, should terrorism join genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
and aggression as crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
(ICC)?1 This inclusion was proposed when the Rome Statute establishing the
International Criminal Court (ICC Statute)2 was drafted, 3 and an international
terrorism court was proposed in 1937 by the League of Nations.4 But new calls for
this inclusion may be a symptom of the general "over-investment in criminal law"
5
* J.D., University of California, Davis; LL.M., University of Paris I (Panth6on-Sorbonne);
Ph.D., University of Paris I (Panthdon-Sorbonne).
1. An international terrorism court was also suggested as the appropriate jurisdiction for
terrorism at the Santa Clara University School of Law Third Annual International
Humanitarian Law Workshop, January 6-9, 2009.
2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2178 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered
into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter ICC Statute].
3. See Press Release, UN Diplomatic Conference, UN Diplomatic Conference Concludes in
Rome With Decision to Establish Permanent International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc
L/ROM/22 (July 17, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/icc/pressrelllrom22.htm (citing
statements by representatives concerning the inclusion of terrorism within the jurisdiction
of the ICC).
4. See MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, 1 LES FORCES IMAGINANTES DU DROIT: LE RELATIF ET
L'UNIVERSEL 287 (2004) [hereinafter DELMAS-MARTY, LE RELATIF ET L'UNIVERSEL].
5. Mireille Delmas-Marty, Introduction to LES CHEMINS DE L'HARMONISATION
PENAL/HARMONIZING CRIMINAL LAW 30 (2008).
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that has plagued both states and the international community (even though
globalization affects less than ten percent of crime)6 since the "war on crime"
began in the 1980s. As a result, instead of remaining the last resort (ultima ratio),
criminal law seems to have become the first. And when the domestic last resort
proves insufficient, the solution is to internationalize, which increases
stigmatization while globalizing repression.7
The phenomenon of "governing through crime" 8 has taken hold in the United
States as elsewhere, bringing with it a slew of new offenses and harsher penalties.
Even the European Union (EU), which has no officially delegated criminal law
powers, has developed quite an extensive program of police and judicial
cooperation in criminal matters since the 1970s, slowly harmonizing national
systems around more repressive norms. 9 In the immediate aftermath of the
September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, many states-and the EU-
were able to obtain acceptance of previously rejected measures both broadening
police powers in terrorism cases and restricting access to immigration and asylum.
Since the adoption of Security Council resolutions 137310 and 1624," in particular,
a further hail of harsh legislation has been passed, producing an international state
6. See Mireille Delmas-Marty, Towards an Integrated European Criminal Law, in 2005
CAMBRIDGE Y.B. OF EUR. LEGAL STUDIES 17, 18.
7. Fr~dric Mdgret notes that internationalizing the struggle of terrorism aimed not only at
obtaining better results, but also at preventing states from "extending 'protective'
jurisdiction, kidnapping terrorists or striking safe havens militarily. All along, the
international legal order may have had more to lose from terrorist attacks than just the
attacks: a subversion of the international legal order by the states themselves .... Frdddric
Mdgret, Justice in Times of Violence, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 327, 328-29 (2003). Seen in this
light, calls for international jurisdiction over terrorists, particularly those responsible for
9/11, may be considered an acknowledgement that internationalization has failed to
accomplish this goal, and an indictment of national tribunals as unable, if not unwilling, to
provide fair trials. See id. at 333.
8. JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME. HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007). See,
e.g., Mireille Delmas-Marty, The Paradigm of the War on Crime: Legitimating Inhuman
Treatment?, 5 J.I.C.J. 584 (2007); The Culture of Control in Ireland: Theorising Recent
Developments in Criminal Justice, 1 WEB J OF CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES (2008),
http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2008/issuel/pdf/campbell 1.pdf.
9. See, e.g., LES CHEMINS DE L'HARMONISATION PtNAL, supra note 5; L'INTtGRATION
PENALE INDIRECTE. INTERACTIONS ENTRE DROIT PENAL ET COOPERATION JUDICIAIRE AU
SEIN DE L'UNION EUROPEENNE (Genevieve Giudicelli-Delage & Stefano Manacorda eds.,
Socidtd de Ldgislation Compard 2005).
10. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
11. S.C. Res. 1624, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sept. 14, 2005).
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of emergency 12 bearing no resemblance to responses to genocide, crimes against
humanity or war crimes. Still, the terrorist threat looms. The reasons for not
elevating terrorism to the rank of "international crime" remain valid: there is
insufficient consensus as to a precise definition or possible exceptions; and
prosecuting terrorism before the ICC risks politicizing that court.
The stated goal of the ICC is to "put an end to impunity for the perpetrators" of
the "most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.'
3
In so doing, it will contribute to the prevention of such crimes and, one hopes,
provide justice to the victims. As UN mechanisms for peace and justice, the ICC
and other international and hybrid criminal tribunals constitute instruments for the
protection of human rights, which are frequently violated on a massive scale when
the "most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole" are
committed. There is no doubt that terrorism is a serious crime that affects the
international community, in the same way that other gross violations of human
rights do. 14 But the focus since 2001 on international "'hyperterrorism,"' i such as
the destruction of the World Trade Center, tends to eclipse other forms of terrorism
that are for the most part "set deep within national borders.' 6 The
internationalization of the struggle against this crime, therefore, leads to a certain
paradox: to combat certain acts of terrorism that transcend borders, a law that
transcends borders has emerged that consists of fairly similar measures applicable
everywhere and that obliges states to cooperate in preventing and punishing acts of
terrorism. But except for police and judicial cooperation, the primary tools used to
combat terrorism since 2001 have reinforced psychological as well as physical
borders as states have taken advantage of the inconsistencies between the
antiterrorism and human rights regimes and the less-than-clear hierarchy of norms.
These inconsistencies, as well as loose use of the word terrorism, lead to
politically expedient results. For example, in 1985, Luis Posada Carriles stood
accused of the 1976 bombing of a Cuban airliner that resulted in the deaths of all
73 people aboard and was also implicated in a terrorist bombing that occurred in
12. Kim Lane Scheppele, Memorandum from Kim Lane Scheppele to Syracuse Participants,
Apr. 1, 2007,
http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/campbell/programs/sawyer/papers/SLAPP%2006-
07/ScheppeleMemo.pdf [hereinafter Scheppele, Memorandum to Syracuse Participants].
13. ICC Statute, supra note 2, pmbl.
14. See Karima Bennoune, Terror/Torture, 26 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 41-6 (2008).
15. Mgret, supra note 7, at 328.
16. DELMAS-MARTY, LE RELATIF ET L'UNIVERSEL, supra note 4, at 285.
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Washington, DC in 1976. While awaiting trial in Venezuela for the airliner
bombing, Posada escaped from jail. In 2002, he was allegedly involved in an
attempt to assassinate Fidel Castro, and in May 2005, he was found in the United
States and arrested. Venezuela requested his extradition; Posada requested asylum.
Members of Congress called for the Bush administration to comply with the
extradition request, but the administration refused, and today, Posada is a free
man-despite the Patriot Act 7 requirement that all aliens suspected of terrorism be
detained.
18
With respect to terrorism, international criminal law would be hard pressed to
fulfill its goals of deterrence and justice for victims. It would, however, be likely to
contribute to erecting more barriers-virtual or real-and to state suppression of
fundamental rights in the name of combating what seems to have become the
"crime of crimes" of the 21 "t century.
To illustrate, I will briefly review the difference between "international" and
"transnational" crimes (Part I) and key elements of the "definitional crisis" that set
terrorism apart from the crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction (Part II). I will then
show that the United States' response to 9/11 and Security Council emphasis on
combating terrorism effectively lifted certain taboos and emboldened states to
renege on their human rights obligations in the name of fighting terrorism (Part
III). I conclude that elevating terrorism to the status of international crime might
exacerbate this problem without fulfilling the functions of international criminal
law.
I. International or transnational? Fundamental differences
between terrorism and the "most serious crimes of concern
to the international community as a whole"
The question of "terrorism under international criminal law" invites reflection
as to the scope and purposes of international criminal law and the extent to which
terrorism may be considered an international crime and, as such, be a candidate for
the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction. Among criminal law's most
important functions is the expressive function: the designation of an act as a crime
17. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 271
(2001) [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act].
18. See Naomi Norberg, A Harmonized Approach to Combating Terrorism? Roadwork Ahead,
in LES CHEMINS DE L'HARMONISATION PENAL, supra note 5.
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indirectly reflects a given society's essential values. In this way, criminal law
serves as a barometer of values at a given time. 19 This is no less true for
international criminal law than domestic criminal law, the manifestation par
excellence of sovereignty. The crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC (genocide,
war crimes, crimes against humanity and aggression) may therefore be deemed to
reflect instances when the disparate states of the world became a society cohesive
enough to express a consensus as to the values protected by those prohibitions.
In the aftermath of World War II, pressure was high to respond to the state-
committed or condoned atrocities that were deemed to affect all of humanity and to
go beyond any one state's power to adequately punish and redress. The barometer
thus read "fair weather" for the creation of international (or supranational) crimes
expressing international society's consensus as to the'values protected by the
prohibitions of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes and subject to
either supranational jurisdiction before international tribunals or universal
jurisdiction20 before domestic courts. Due to that consensus-and precise, globally
accepted definitions-those crimes are today subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC,
as well as other international criminal tribunals.
The ICC thus constitutes an addition to the numerous human rights institutions
established since 1945.21 Its statute explicitly declines to limit the category of the
"most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole" to the
four categories mentioned above (and listed in article 5),22 but there are few clues
to be found indicating what other crimes might fit therein. The ICC statute itself is
silent on the issue; neither the ad hoc international criminal tribunals (ICTs) nor
the International Law Commission have offered any real clarification; and legal
scholars have avoided tackling the issue head on.23 Isabelle Fouchard's recent
dissertation on crime in international law thus offers important insight not only into
the incorporation of criminal law, the sine qua non of the state,24 into international
19. See Isabelle Fouchard, Crime international: Entre internationalisation du droit pdnal et
p~nalisation du droit international 19 (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. doctoral dissertation,
University of Paris I (Pantheon-Sorbonne) and The Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies, Geneva) (on file with author and the Biblioth~que Cujas) [hereinafter
Fouchard, Crime international].
20. See Roger O'Keefe, Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept, 2 J.I.C.J. 735
(2004).
21. See Rend Blattmann & Kirsten Bowman, Achievements and Problems of the International
Criminal Court: A View From Within, 6 J.I.C.J. 711, 713 (2008).
22. ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 5.
23. See Fouchard, Crime international, supra note 19, at 40-5, 108-14.
24. Id. at 17.
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law, but also into the distinction between the "international" or "supranational"
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression, and
"transnational" or "internationalized" crimes, such as terrorism, drug trafficking
and corruption.
Without wishing to minimize the debates as to the differences in nature between
the two types of crimes or to oversimplify them, it seems safe to assert that
international crimes originate in and are defined by international law, and
individual liability for them lies in international law. 25 For example, the ICC
statute codifies, in a sense, international customary law with respect to crimes
against humanity and war crimes, 26 while genocide was established by
international convention. 27 Other crimes satisfy these criteria yet are not included
in the ICC's jurisdiction, which appears to be limited by the further criteria of
"extreme gravity" and "touching the international community as a whole. 28 In
accordance with the principle of legality (no crime or punishment without a prior
law), the material and intellectual elements of these three crimes, as well as the
penalties, are set out in precise terms in the ICC statute.
Transnational crimes, however, are essentially domestic crimes that may
comprise an extranational element. For example, the bombing of the federal
building in Oklahoma City by Timothy McVeigh, an American citizen, is an
example of domestic terrorism. 29 But when the crime crosses borders, occurs
where no state has territorial jurisdiction (such as on the high seas), or involves
persons of differing nationalities, it contains an extranational element and exceeds
25. See id. at 33-5.
26. Id. at 40.
27. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102
Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) (entered into force for the
United States, Feb. 23, 1989).
28. Fouchard, Crime international, supra note 19, at 44 (citing Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija,
IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, § 141, (Dec. 10, 1998)) (omission of torture is a clear indication
that there are different categories of international crime; thus, exclusion from ICC
jurisdiction does not mean a particular crime is not extremely grave or does not touch the
international community as a whole).
29. Widely considered one of the worst terrorist attacks in the United States, the bombing
provides an example of the problems inherent in defining and proving terrorism. McVeigh
was charged with and convicted of explosives violations. His act, however, does not
qualify as terrorism under definitions requiring a motive of intimidation: it was perpetrated
not to compel the government to do or refrain from doing anything, but in retaliation for
what it had done. See, e.g., Kevin Flynn, 'One of Ours' Analysis Bombs Out, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 24, 1998, at 3E; Gaylord Shaw, In McVeigh's Behalf: Defense
Lawyers Ask for Mercy, NEwSDAY, June 7, 1997, at A04.
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an individual state's ability to respond alone.30 But in such cases, international law
merely promotes interstate police and judicial cooperation and universal
jurisdiction, not supranational jurisdiction. The extranational element is in many
cases acknowledged through the label "international terrorism," but the crime
continues to be prosecuted according to domestic law: 31 not all states ratify
international conventions and when they do, they incorporate (at times modifying)
the international definitions into domestic law. This "nationalization" is reflected
in the fact that not all states distinguish between domestic and international
terrorism. For example, the French Penal Code includes airplane hijacking in its
long list of acts constituting terrorism, without any domestic or international
qualifiers.32 Moreover, international law imposes few restrictions on states as they
30. See Fouchard, Crime international, supra note 19, at 130, 136 (analyzing The Hague
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T.
1641, 860 U.N.TS. 105 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1971) [hereinafter The Hague Hijacking
Convention]; Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 (entered into force Jan.
26, 1973) [hereinafter Montreal Civil Aviation Safety Convention]; International
Convention against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11081, 1316
U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force June 3, 1983) (entered into force for the United States, Jan.
6, 1985); and Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res.
54/109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. AJRES/54/109 (Dec. 9, 1999), 39
I.L.M. 270 (2000) (entered into force Apr. 10, 2002) (entered into force for the United
States July 26, 2002) [hereinafter Terrorist Financing Convention].
31. See id. at 45. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon makes this clear: established to prosecute a
political assassination such as the one that sparked the drafting of the 1937 League of
Nations Convention, the Tribunal will apply Lebanese law. See S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc.
S/Res/1757 (May 30, 2007) (establishing the Special Tribunal). The Tribunal's statute,
annexed to the Resolution, provides:
Article 2 Applicable criminal law
The following shall be applicable to the prosecution and punishment of the crimes
referred to in article 1, subject to the provisions of this Statute:
(a) The provisions of the Lebanese Criminal Code relating to the prosecution and
punishment of acts of terrorism, crimes and offences against life and personal integrity,
illicit associations and failure to report crimes and offences, including the rules regarding
the material elements of a crime, criminal participation and conspiracy; and
(b) Articles 6 and 7 of the Lebanese law of 11 January 1958 on "Increasing the penalties
for sedition, civil war and interfaith struggle.
Id. Attachment, Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, art. 2.
32. See C. PtN., art. 421-1(1).
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struggle with transnational crimes.33 The effect has been to extend sovereign reach
rather than limit it, 34 as in the case of international crimes.
While a similar "nationalization" of definitions may occur with respect to the
crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction, the struggle against such crimes was initiated
at the international level. State action thus has a common reference point. Such is
not the case with respect to terrorism, where sovereign prerogative is clear. States
have been combating "terrorism" under various names since well before the
international community addressed the issue. And since the internationalized
struggle under the contemporary regime began in the 1960s, the lack of agreement
on an exception for "freedom fighters" has meant that each state has fought
terrorism according to its own definition. Despite greater harmonization of
definitions since the 1990s, there are still unresolved issues that make agreement
on a comprehensive definition unlikely in the near future35 and that point to
fundamental differences between terrorism and international crimes.
II. Definitional elements that distinguish terrorism from
international crimes
A. Terrorism as a crime of transferred intent
The classic approach to defining terrorism constitutes an attempt to put the
magic slipper on the wrong foot. The term "terrorism" has its roots in the Reign of
Terror that followed the French Revolution: 36 considered "dreadful but
necessary," 37 this purge of enemies of the Revolution and other persons suspected
of being corrupt saw 16,000 people guillotined in nine months. The only way to
escape definitively was to flee the country, as those who maneuvered to gain the
pleasure of the rulers might just as easily fall from grace onto the executioner's
block. In this sense, "terrorizing the civilian population," a form or subset of war
crimes prosecuted at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
33. See Fouchard, Crime international, supra note 19, at 156-57.
34. See id. at 135-36.
35. See generally Norberg, A Harmonized Approach, supra note 18.
36. See, e.g., id. at 204; DELMAS-MARTY, LE RELATIF ET L'UNIVERSEL, supra note 4, at 285.
37. The France of Victor Hugo,
http://www.mtholyoke.eduicourses/rschwartihist255/kat-anna/terror.html (last visited Oct.
12, 2009).
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Yugoslavia, 38 seems accurate: against the backdrop of ongoing armed conflict, acts
designed specifically to intimidate persons with minimal chances of escape may
indeed produce terror and consequent compliance with demands. Such may be the
case today in Pakistan's Swat valley, where a Taliban reign of terror currently has
residents scurrying to listen to their radios, as "failure to listen and learn might lead
to a lashing-or a beheading." 39 Similarly, Afghan girls have been victims of acid
attacks designed to scare them away from school. 40 Fear may also linger in
communities such as these where terrorism has taken an extensive toll.41 As
Karima Bennoune points out, however, the human rights violations may be a more
important consequence than fear.42
Outside this context, definitions based on the notion that "terrorism" intimidates
or terrorizes the population seem counterproductive.43 The November 2008
bombing of two luxury hotels in Mumbai sparked the immediate politicization of
citizens who realized their apathy had left them with a government unable to
protect them,44 and one of the targeted hotels proudly reopened just three weeks
after the attacks.45 The July 2005 bombings in London produced archetypical "stiff
upper lip" reactions; commuters in Paris (including this author) and elsewhere
38. See, e.g., Beth Van Schaack, Finding the Tort of Terrorism in International Law, 28 REV.
LITIG. 381, 432-33, 456 (2008) (discussing prosecution of this crime at the ICTY). Cf
Mireille Delmas-Marty, Global Crime Calls for Global Justice, 10 EUR. J. CRIME, CRIM. L.
& CRIM. JUST. 286, 292-93 (2002) [hereinafter Delmas-Marty, Global Crime] (suggesting
the September 11 attacks meet the ICC definition of a crime against humanity).
39. Richard A. Oppel Jr. and Pir Zubair Shah, For Pakistanis under Taliban, a reign of terror
via radio, INTL. HERALD TRIB., Jan. 25, 2009, at 1.
40. Dexter Filkins, Afghan Girls, Scarred by Acid, Defy Terror, Embracing School, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan 14. 2009, at Al.
41. See Bennoune, supra note 14, at 45.
42. See id. at 41.
43. See, e.g., C. PtN., art. 421-1 (acts of terrorism are those committed, inter alia, with the "goal
of seriously disturbing public order by intimidation or terror"). Here, subjective
intimidation would seem to be required. Cf Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism,
U.N. Doc. A/Res 49/60 (Dec. 9, 1994) ("Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a
state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political
purposes"); Terrorist Financing Convention, supra note 30 ("... when the purpose of such
act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population"). In the latter two definitions,
there is merely an objective intent to intimidate. While such an intent is clearly present in
the Afghan or Pakistani situations, it is less clear in other situations.
44. See Anand Giridharadas, Mumbai's Elite See Price of Indifference, HERALD TRIBUNE, Dec.
4,2008, 1.
45. See Anil Dawar, Mumbai Terror Attack Hotel Reopens, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Dec. 21, 2008,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/21/mumbai-terrorist-attacks (last visited Oct.
20, 2009).
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continue to take their daily trains in the wake of station bombings; and Israelis
continue to frequent outdoor markets, common sites of suicide attacks. Indeed, we
all continue to travel by plane. The alternative or additional element of a motive,
such as seeking to "compel a government or an international organization to do or
to abstain from doing any act,46 is perhaps even more counterproductive. As
Bennoune's list of "endogenous and exogenous causes" of "fundamentalist
movements in the Muslim world" indicates, 47 many such acts are more akin to
48McVeigh's act of retaliation than an attempt to terrorize.
In this regard, many acts of terrorism resemble other random acts of violence
subject to domestic criminal law. What sets them, and particularly
"hyperterrorism," apart from other transnational crimes such as corruption and
trafficking is its warlike character, its capacity for mass destruction (though, as
Professor Paust rightly points out,49 this is not a requirement). Putting the slipper
on the other foot thus looks appropriate at first glance: recent history has shown
that mass crimes can be committed by non-state actors, and international
humanitarian law and practice before ICTs reflect the increased liability of non-
state actors for international crimes.5 0 But the crimes prosecuted before these
tribunals have been committed in the context of a conflict reaching critical mass:
46. Terrorist Financing Convention, supra note 30, art. 2(b).
47. See Bennoune, supra note 14, at 54. Exogenous factors include
the now-infamous training, supported by the U.S. (with significant British, Pakistani and
Saudi involvement), of anyone willing to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan-no
matter how extreme their ideology ... Many of those founding or leading terror cells
from the Philippines to Morocco fought in Afghanistan, where they built a sophisticated
and dangerous network, and then took their training home with them ... The other major
contributing factor from outside the Muslim world, particularly to recruitment and
sympathy for Muslim fundamentalist armed groups, and the apologetics on their behalf
from various quarters, is that of disastrous Westem policies toward Muslim countries.
Examples include 2003's illegal invasion of Iraq and failure to equitably resolve the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Id. at 54-5.
48. In this regard, the Madrid bombing of 2004 constitutes an exception. Occurring just three
days before a national election as Spain prepared, under the incumbent government, to join
coalition forces in Iraq, the attack may well have influenced the outcome-in favor of the
opposition party-of the election. The bombers' intent may thus have been to compel the
people, rather than the government, to take or refrain from taking a particular action. The
response to this attack also constitutes an exception. See the Conclusion, infra.
49. See Jordan J. Paust, Terrorism's Proscription and Core Elements of an Objective
Definition, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 51, 61.
50. See, e.g., Andrew Clapham, Extending International Criminal Law beyond the Individual to
Corporations and Armed Opposition Groups, 6 J.I.C.J. 899 (2008).
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without the forces, structure or organization generally associated with the state but
now within the grasp of some rebel groups, mass-or "widespread and
systematic"-atrocities such as those prosecuted first at Nuremberg and today at
the ICC, the ICTs and various hybrid tribunals depend on massive firepower.
Though al Qaeda strikes may fit this image,5' it is a vision that excludes the daily
intimidation occurring in some tribal and religious communities 52 and ignores the
fact that, as independent terrorist cells and individuals like McVeigh illustrate,
terrorism in and of itself requires no such state-like attributes. Therefore, while the
fight against impunity's shift in focus from state to non-state actors clearly tracks
reality with respect to genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, this
same shift with respect to terrorism in fact blurs the focus of the crimes
themselves.
The motive behind genocide is to "destroy ... a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such," 53 while crimes against humanity comprise acts
"committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any
civilian population .... 54 In both cases, victims are members of an identified
group, and are targeted as such. Though exceptions are possible when a conflict
extends beyond the territories occupied by the warring parties, war crimes seem to
be similarly conceived as crimes directed at specific populations or installations:
members of the opposing camp, neutral installations or personnel (such as the UN
or Red Cross), and even members of one's own camp, such as when children are
conscripted. 55
Terrorism, particularly transnational, politically or ideologically motivated
terrorism, however, often has a more indirect quality. Targets may of course be
51. See Delmas-Marty, Global Crime, supra note 38, at 286 (suggesting that the September 11
strikes meet the definition of crimes against humanity).
52. For an insightful examination of how the separation between law and religion leads to laws
ignoring women's efforts for change in such societies and, therefore, enables continued
discrimination, see Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399 (2003). Such
acts may, however, be treated as gender-based persecution. See, e.g., Carolyn Patty Blum &
Nancy Kelly, The Protection of Women Refugees, in 3 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 197 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., 2001); DROIT
D'ASILE ET FEMMES. GUIDE PRATIQUE (Groupe asile femmes (GRAF) 2007). See also U.N.
High Comm'r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection No. 1: Gender-Related
Persecution Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7, 2002), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3d36flc64.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).
53. ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 6.
54. Id. art. 7.
55. Id. art. 8.
8 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2010)
chosen on the basis of nationality (the American embassies simultaneously
bombed in Kenya and Tanzania, the tourists asked if they were British or
American during the 2008 Mumbai hotel attacks), or presumed nationality (the
World Trade Center or a London bus). But among the victims may be persons of
other nationalities, and the purpose of the attack may in fact not be to destroy the
group, but to express political or other ideological disagreement with a particular
state. In such cases, victims are merely symbols. In fact, the first definition of
terrorism contained in an international convention reflects this anti-state
character.
56
Spurred by the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia, the 1937 League
of Nations convention defined terrorism as "[a]ll criminal acts directed against a
State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular
persons or a group of persons or the general public." 57 This convention was not
ratified, and the next attempt to address terrorism in an international convention
would not come until 1963, when the first of three conventions dealing with
airplane hijackings and bombings was adopted under the auspices of the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
B. Internationalization of the struggle: combating terrorism without defining it
leads to disparate, domestic responses
The three ICAO conventions defining offenses against plane and passenger
safety are considered to be the first anti-terrorism conventions. Widely ratified
(approximately 180 State Parties), they do not employ the word "terrorism," as no
agreement on a definition was then possible.59 The Hague Convention of 1970
56. This is certainly not the only kind of terrorism. Bennoune rightly encourages thinking in
terms other than state/anti-state, noting that "[wiomen are frequent targets of terrorist
activity, either as part of the civilian population generally, or when particularly targeted as
women. Gender-based terrorism, such as attacks on women's health clinics that perform
abortions or killings of women based on their refusal to conform to 'dress codes,' ... are
often downplayed or neglected altogether within the security paradigm of terrorism.
Governments and the media rarely label such acts as terrorism." Bennoune, supra note 14,
at 48.
57. Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism art. 1(2), League of Nations
Doc. C.547M.384 1937 V (1937).
58. Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept.
14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 (entered into force Dec. 4, 1969); The Hague
Hijacking Convention, supra note 30; Montreal Civil Aviation Safety Convention, supra
note 30.
59. See Norberg, A Harmonized Approach, supra note 18, at 205.
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(Hijacking Convention) constitutes the model subsequently used for all terrorism
conventions, including the regional conventions adopted between 1971 and 2002 .6o
In addition to omitting a definition of terrorism per se, the ICAO and subsequent
conventions make it abundantly clear that they apply only to those acts over which
either no state or more than one state has jurisdiction: 6' but for such exceptional
62acts, terrorism is a domestic crime.
In fact, until the 1980s, terrorist attacks tended to track national affairs, even
when they comprised an extranational element: the German Red Army Faction
attacked American military personnel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict spilled
over its borders as not only the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), but also
the Japanese Red Army, carried out attacks related to this conflict. But the 1979
kidnapping of American embassy personnel in Teheran ushered in an era of
terrorism more appropriately labeled transnational, as between 1982 and 1985
various Islamic groups, often with state support, drastically increased their
bombings, hijackings and kidnappings of foreign (largely American and French)
63targets. More decisive, perhaps, was the October 1985 Achille Lauro hijacking
60. Compare The Hague Hijacking Convention, supra note 30, with Organization of American
States [OAS], Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism taking the Form of
Crimes against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance, Feb. 2,
1971, O.A.S.T.S. No. 37 [hereinafter OAS Convention], European Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977, E.T.S. No. 90 [hereinafter European Terrorism
Convention], South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation [SAARC], SAARC
Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, Nov. 4, 1987, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3dd8ab3a4.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2009), League
of Arab States, Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, Apr. 22, 1998, available
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3de5e4984.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2009),
Organization of African Unity [OAU], OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating
of Terrorism, Jun. 14 1999, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f4blf7l4.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2009)
[hereinafter OAU Convention], Organisation of the Islamic Conference, [OIC] Convention
of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on Combating Terrorism, Jul. 1, 1999, Res.
No. 59/26-P, Annex [hereinafter OIC Convention], Commonwealth of Independent States,
Treaty on Cooperation among the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent
States in Combating Terrorism, 1999, June 4, 1999, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47fdfb290.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2009), and OAS,
Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, Mar. 6, 2002, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3de4cc674.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).
61. See Fouchard, Crime international, supra note 19, at 130-36 (examining exclusion clauses).
62. As pointed out above, even in the event such a convention is applicable, it will trigger only
inter-state cooperation; prosecution will occur before a domestic court applying domestic
law. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
63. Norberg, A Harmonized Approach, supra note 18, at 206 n. 15.
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and murder of a wheelchair-bound American passenger by Palestinian gunmen.
64
In December of that year, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution
"unequivocally condemn[ing], as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of
terrorism wherever and by whomever committed., 65 Soon thereafter, General
Assembly terrorism resolutions dropped the exemption for acts committed in the
course of armed liberation struggles and the incitement to address the underlying
causes of terrorism,66 and the Security Council declared acts of terrorism to be
threats to international peace and security. 67 It was thus in a position to take action,
as it did in 2001, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Nonetheless, the emerging
consensus that terrorism is inexcusable produced only two, competing definitions
of terrorism per se at the United Nations level.65
The 1994 resolution on "Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism"
provides a general definition of terrorism similar to that of the 1937 League of
Nations convention. Terrorism comprises
[c]riminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a
group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance
unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial,
ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.
69
The difference lies in the implicit inclusion of state terrorism and the clear
intent to disallow any exceptions. This resolution did not, however, lead to a
convention evidencing agreement on a definition of terrorism. In fact, the 1999
Terrorist Financing Convention provides a different one,
64. See Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 921 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1990); Lauro Lines S.R.L. v.
Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 (1989).
65. G.A. Res. 40/61, 1, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., 108th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. AIRES/40/61
(Dec. 9, 1985).
66. Until 1991, the General Assembly adopted its semi-annual terrorism-related resolutions
under the heading: Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes
innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms and study of the underlying
causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration,
grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including
their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes. See G.A. Res. 3034 (XXVII), U.N.
GAOR, 27th Sess., 2114th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. AIRES/3034 (XXVII) (Dec. 18, 1972).
67. See S.C. Res. 731, U.N. Doc. S/RES/731 (Jan. 21, 1992) (addressing the bombings in 1988
of Pan Am flight 103 and in1989 of UTA flight 772, respectively).
68. Regional conventions adopted a comprehensive approach from the outset, but the results
have been unsatisfactory due not only to problems with the definitions, but also because
ratification has often been subject to reserves. See Norberg, A Harmonized Approach, supra
note 18, at 205.
69. G.A. Res. 49/60, 1.3, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., 84th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/60
(Dec. 9, 1994).
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Any... act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other
person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the
purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.
70
Whether or not this constitutes a definition of terrorism, 71 it is not the product of
consensus: prior to September 11, 2001, only four states had ratified this
convention, and subsequent ratification may in large part be due to Security
Council Resolution 1373 of September 28, 2001,72 which requires all UN member
states to ratify it.
7 3
This definition is broader than the previous one in that it requires only
intimidation, rather than a "state of terror," and includes both state and anti-state-
or even anti-international-organization-terrorism. But it is limited to situations of
armed conflict, thus paradoxically limiting the scope of what, by force of a
Security Council Resolution taken in response to specific attacks, has become the
globally applicable, if not globally agreed, definition. In fact, even had it been the
law at the time, the reference to "civilians" and "armed conflict" might exclude
those attacks.74 As Susan Tiefenbrun has pointed out, the international community
cannot agree on just who qualifies as a "civilian." 75 Moreover, a significant block
of states insists on maintaining an exception for conduct perpetrated during armed
struggle: the 1999 conventions of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and
70. Terrorist Financing Convention, supra note 30, art. 2(b).
71. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 121 (2003); CHRISTIAN PHILIP,
RAPPORT SUR L'UNION EUROPtENNE ET LA LUTTE CONTRE LE TERRORISME 6 (2005). But
see Gilbert Guillaume, Terrorism and International Law, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 537, 539
(2004) (qualifying the Terrorist Financing Convention, supra note 30, as a failed attempt at
a definition).
72. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 10.
73. See Norberg, A Harmonized Approach, supra note 18, at 208.
74. Though the term "civilian" may apply to any person not engaged in military service even in
peacetime, the phrase "or any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities"
(emphasis added) arguably indicates that "civilian" is used to distinguish non-military from
military personnel in an ongoing armed conflict. See Terrorist Financing Convention, supra
note 30, art. 2(b). Despite rhetoric that the Al Qaeda strikes constituted the opening salvo in
an armed conflict, the definition of "aggression" proposed in February 2009 by the Special
Working Group on the Crime of Aggression excludes "acts of terrorism performed by non-
State actors, such as leaders of Al-Qaida [sic]." Press Release, United Nations, Press
Conference on Special Working Group on Crime of Aggression, 1 5 (Feb. 13, 2009),
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2009/090213_ICC.doc.htm (last visited Oct. 30,
2009).
75. Susan Tiefenbrun, A Semiotic Approach to a Legal Definition of Terrorism, 9 ILSA J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 357, 363 (2003).
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the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) 76 both recite in General
Assembly terms their unequivocal condemnation of terrorism in all its forms, then
exempt acts committed during armed liberation struggles.77
Thus, more than seventy years after the first attempt to define terrorism in an
international convention, consensus is still lacking on some important elements.
Various authors maintain there is enough agreement on at least three elements to
constitute a consensus definition of terrorism, 78 but the internationalized struggle
against terrorism has been conducted with, at best, competing definitions that have
led to disparate state responses. Judge Rosalyn Higgins thus concludes that
"[t]errorism is a term without any legal significance. It is merely a convenient way
of alluding to activities, whether of States or of individuals, widely disapproved of
and in which either the methods used are unlawful, or the targets protected, or
both. 79
Higgins may be wrong with respect to states, however. Despite the 1999
Convention's implicit inclusion of them as perpetrators of terrorism, as mentioned
above, they have been excluded as such from international definitions since 1937.
Domestic law also makes this clear. For example, the French Penal Code places
the section on terrorism in the portion dedicated to crimes against the state or
national security. 80 In fact, state actors responsible for reigns of terror or "dirty"
wars are prosecuted (or pursued under the Alien Tort Statute) 81 for the
international crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction and for grave, systematic human
76. The Arab Convention concluded at this time by the League of Arab States, which maintains
observer status at the United Nations, is substantially similar to the OIC Convention.
77. See OAU Convention, supra note 60, art. 3(1) ("[T]he struggle waged by peoples in
accordance with the principles of international law for their liberation or self-determination
... shall not be considered as terrorist acts.") The phrase "in accordance with" clearly
modifies "the struggle waged" and may be interpreted to mean that the means used during
such struggle must comply with international law. Such restrictive intent is unclear,
however, and even less so in the French version. Cf OIC Convention, supra note 60, art.
2(a) ("Peoples' struggle ... aimed at liberation and self-determination in accordance with
the principles of international law shall not be considered a terrorist crime.").
78. See, e.g., CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 71, at 124; Guillaume,
Terrorism and International Law, supra note 71, at 540; Jordan J. Paust, Terrorism 's
Proscription and Core Elements of an Objective Definition, supra note 49, at 54-59; Van
Schaack, Finding the Tort in Terrorism, supra note 38, at 407, 429.
79. Guillaume, Terrorism and International Law, supra note 71, at 541 (citing ROSALYN
HIGGINS, The General International Law of Terrorism, in ROSALYN HIGGINS & MAURICE
FLORY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TERRORISM 28 (1997)).
80. See C. PtN., Livre IV. Des crimes et ddlits contre la nation, l'Etat et la paix publique.
81. Alien's Action for Tort, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
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rights violations, even though there may well be both intent to intimidate a
population and a result of intimidation or terror.
Indeed, the focus on anti-state terrorism is a key element in the definitional
conundrum and politically expedient designation (or not) of certain individuals as
terrorists. While these factors led to terrorism's exclusion from the ICC statute, the
alleged lack of a definition is not an absolute barrier: terrorism could join
aggression as a crime too imprecisely defined to be prosecuted. A higher hurdle is
the nature of the response to terrorism, as the lack of a definition has posed no
obstacle to state repression.
III. When Anti-terrorism Means Anti-Human Rights
Unlike genocide or crimes against humanity, for example, terrorism is the
subject of ongoing police operations and measures that at times violate the very
human rights the ICC at least indirectly protects. In fact, the 1951 Refugee
Convention 82 instituted an uneasy tension between human rights and terrorism by
denying its protections to suspected terrorists. Tension became a rift as terrorism
and other transnational crimes increased and incited states to tighten their borders.
Due to measures adopted in the wake of the World Trade Center and Pentagon
attacks of 2001, the Madrid bombing of 2004 and the London bombing of 2005, a
chasm now yawns between human rights and counter-terrorist regimes as, in the
name of fighting terrorism, states have reneged on their commitments, inter alia,
not to discriminate or torture, and to protect privacy, free speech and the
presumption of innocence. Key factors in lifting taboos are the United States'
response to the September 11 attacks and Security Council resolutions implicitly
granting priority to preventing terrorism, thus contributing to an internationalized
state of emergency reflecting an authoritarian model of criminal justice at best.83
A. From an institutionalized state of emergency in the United States...
More than a period of crisis, a state of emergency is a legal tool. Employed
according to rules laid out in domestic and international law and governed by the
82. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered
into force Apr. 22, 1954).
83. Portions of the following discussion are adapted from Naomi Norberg, L'internationalistion
du droit amdricain: I'Alien Tort Claims Act, le dispositif antiterroriste et l'acteur civique
(2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Paris I (Panthdon-Sorbonne)) (on file
with the Bibliothque Cujas).
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rule of law, it enables states to temporarily derogate from certain fundamental
rights, but only in the sole interest of preserving democracy and restoring order.
When the tool is misused, such as when the state of emergency is prolonged
unnecessarily or serves purposes other than facilitating a return to normal, there is
a danger it will become institutionalized, i.e., it will gain constitutional status 84 and
become the norm. There is also a danger of slipping from a liberal model of
criminal justice policy to an authoritarian or even a totalitarian model.
85
1. Criminal justice, terrorism and states of emergency: when the
exception becomes the norm
Criminal justice policy refers to the way in which society organizes its response
to deviant behavior.86 This term includes social deviation as well as criminal
delinquency, while "response" includes prevention as well as the post-hoc reaction.
As their names suggest, Mireille Delmas-Marty's models track their underlying
political ideologies while describing who responds to what phenomenon under
ideal conditions. For example, the liberal model corresponds to the twentieth-
century liberal democracy in which social deviance remains distinct from criminal
delinquency. Society responds to the former; the state responds to the latter,
subject to the law and the separation of powers typical of the rule of law. The
authoritarian model represents a system in which executive power is strengthened
and the state may respond to both deviance and delinquency, though these remain
distinct. The distinction is lost in the totalitarian model, however: all is either
deviance or delinquency. In the latter case, called "repressive networks, 87 social
or political deviance-thinking, believing or acting differently, or just being
different-is considered to pose as much of a threat as criminal delinquency and is
met with a penal response from the state.
In a state of emergency, a liberal state shifts to an authoritarian model:
emergency measures, whether designed to contain terrorism or a threat to public
84. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Tenth Annual Report and List of States Which,
since 1 January 1985, have Proclaimed, Extended or Terminated a State of Emergency,
8, 42, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/19 (June 23, 1997) (prepared by Leandro Despouy)
[hereinafter Despouy, Tenth Annual Report].
85. See MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, MODtLES ET MOUVEMENTS DE POLITIQUE CRIMINELLE
(1982) [hereinafter DELMAS-MARTY, MODtLES ET MOUVEMENTS]; MIREILLE DELMAS-
MARTY, GRANDS SYSTtMES DE POLITIQUE CRIMINELLE (1992) [hereinafter DELMAS-
MARTY, GRANDS SYSTtMES].
86. See DELMAS-MARTY, MODELES ET MOUVEMENTS, supra note 85, at 13.
87. Id. See also DELMAS-MARTY, GRANDS SYSTLMES, supra note 85, at 55-6, 198-200.
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health, target dangerousness rather than guilt. They therefore constitute an
extension of the state response, usually reserved for criminal delinquency, to
deviance. When this extension results in dangerousness becoming the target of
penal sanctions, the state has slid over into the totalitarian model of criminal
justice.
Typical techniques for extending the application of criminal law to deviants
include broad or vague statutes, retroactive application of criminal law, and
elimination of the presumption of innocence, the right to choose one's own legal
counsel, or the right to confront one's accusers. Further techniques such as closed
trials and preventive detention (i.e., long-term administrative detention or, in
extreme cases, forced disappearance) help break the link between society and the
deviant-delinquent, who is then perceived as "other." Psychological barriers
between society and the "other" then arise or are reinforced, while those between
society and the state dissolve, leading to state-society fusion (hence the name
"totalitarian").
Many "liberal" states have instituted criminal procedure regimes dedicated to
crimes considered particularly serious, such as terrorism, drug trafficking and
organized crime. These regimes constitute a permanent derogation from generally
applicable criminal defense rights and track the authoritarian model. For example,
pre-charge police custody may be extended, and this extension may be coupled
with severe limits on the right to consult a lawyer.88 Such exceptional regimes may
also be instituted in the face of an emergency. In this latter instance, despite the
adoption of the American and Universal Declarations of Human Rights 89 and the
entry into force of the major regional and international human rights conventions
and covenants, such regimes are often abused. Claiming terrorists to be in their
midst, more than one state has declared a state of emergency, suspended
fundamental rights and perhaps even prosecuted alleged terrorists in military
commissions closed to the public. 90 Activating such an exceptional regime may
88. See discussion infra.
89. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, O.A.S. Off. Rec.
OEZ/Ser. L/V/I.4 Rev. (1965); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A
(III), at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
90. See, e.g., TRIBUNAUX MILITAIRES ET JURIDICTIONS D'EXCEPTION EN MUTATION:
PERSPECTIVES COMPARtES ET INTERNATIONALES (Elisabeth Lambert-Abdelgawad ed.,
2007) (encouraging international jurisdiction over terrorism since 2001 as an alternative to
military commissions, as if these were the only two options). See generally Mdgret, Justice
in Times of Violence, supra note 7.
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thus put the state on the slippery slope from the authoritarian model to the
totalitarian model and/or the institutionalization of a state of emergency.
2. The post-2001 institutionalization of a state of emergency and slide
toward the totalitarian model of criminal justice in the United States
The United States took its first step onto this slope when it failed to comply, as
it consistently had in the past and continued to do thereafter, with its obligation
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)9" to notify
the United Nations that it had declared a state of emergency and to indicate the
territorial and temporal extent of that emergency.92 It planted its second foot by
passing the Patriot Act under conditions indicative of a lack of separation of
powers93 typical of a situation of institutionalized emergency.94 At the same time,
the Attorney General issued orders authorizing him to (1) override immigration
judges and detain aliens until he has determined they are not dangerous, 95 and (2)
monitor communications between detainees and their attorneys.96 With both feet
thus firmly planted, the executive pushed off under cover of Congress's joint
resolution authorizing the use of force, 97 issued the President's Military Order of
November 13, 2001 (Military Order)98 and whizzed on down.
91. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 52, 21
U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force
March 23, 1976) (ratified by the United States in 1992) [hereinafter ICCPR].
92. See id. art. 4(1) & 4(3); Lawless v. Ireland, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15 (1961) (interpreting the
criteria enabling derogation from the European Convention in an emergency). See also
Diane Marie Amann, Le dispositif am~ricain de lutte contre le terrorisme, REVUE DE
SCIkNCE CRIMINELLE ET DE DROIT PENAL COMPARt (RSC) 745, 757-58 (2002); Joan
Fitzpatrick, The Constitutional and International Invalidity of Military Commissions under
the November 13, 2001 'Military Order' (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author); Norberg, L'Internationalisation du droit am~ricain, supra note 83, at 171-80.
93. See Beryl A. Howell, Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1145 (2004).
94. See Despouy, Tenth Annual Report, supra note 84, 145-46; Norberg,
L'Internationalisation du droit amdricain, supra note 83, 186-88.
95. Attorney General Order 2528-2001 / RIN 11 5-AG41, 66 Fed. Reg. 54909-12 (Oct. 26,
2001).
96. Attorney General Order 2529-2001 / RIN 1120-ABO8, 66 Fed. Reg. 55061-66 (Oct. 26,
2001).
97. S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 147 CONG. REc. S9413-01 (2003) (enacted) (authorizing the
President to use all "necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001 .").
98. U.S. Presidential Military Order - Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens
in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Military
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An in-depth examination of these measures and their consequences is beyond
the scope of this article and can be found elsewhere. 99 I will simply review here
some of the ways in which these measures constitute a shift to a model of criminal
justice that bears a striking resemblance to Delmas-Marty's totalitarian model and
satisfies the laundry list of criteria for institutionalizing a state of emergency set
out by the UN Special Rapporteur on states of emergency. Essentially, both
phenomena involve a significant increase in executive and perhaps military power.
The executive then takes on the role of legislator and sometimes judge to respond
not only to crime, but also to deviance, particularly dangerousness.
The Patriot Act was passed under conditions indicating a weakening of the
separation of powers, and significantly consolidates executive power. For example,
executive spying replaced criminal investigations in cases subject, most
notoriously, to sections 213 ("sneak and peak"), 215 (access to library and other
records), 218 (electronic surveillance) and 505 (National Security Letters).100
These provisions allow(ed)'0 ' the executive to undertake searches and seizures
with less judicial scrutiny than is required in a criminal investigation under the
Fourth Amendment and in conditions that violate the First Amendment.'0 2 The
Attorney General's order regarding the detention of aliens further overrides the
judicial check, while the order authorizing monitoring of detainee-attorney
Order] (exceeding Congress' joint resolution by extending its application to acts of
terrorism committed both prior to and after September 11,2001).
99. See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, Guantdnamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263 (2003);
Viet D. Dinh & Wendy J. Keefer, FISA and the Patriot Act: A Look Back and a Look
Forward, 35 GEO. L.J. ANNUAL REV. CRIM. PRO. iii (2006); Susan N. Herman, The USA
Patriot Act and the Submajoritarian Fourth Amendment, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 67
(2006); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the
Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002); Norberg, L'Internationalisation du droit
am~ricain, supra note 83, at 161-286; Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations
to Violate International Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 811 (2005).
100. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 17, §§ 213 (modifying 18 U.S.C. § 3103a), 215 (modifying
50 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq.), 218 (modifying 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B) & 1823(a)(7)(B)), &
505 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b)), 115 Stat. 272, 285-286, 287-88, 291, 365-366.
Sections 215 and 505 enable the executive to obtain, without reasonable cause and without
notifying the person concerned, personal data stored by a third party. I therefore consider
them to be equivalent to a secret search.
101. Sections 218 and 505 have both been held unconstitutional, though the judge's inability to
check the executive was at issue only with respect to section 218. See Doe v. Gonzales, 500
F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding section 505's gag order violates the First
Amendment); Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1039 (D. Or. 2007).
102. See, e.g., Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Humanitarian Law
Project v. Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
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communications eliminates one of "the oldest of the privileges for confidential
communications known to the common law."'10 3 The limits placed by these
measures on important First, Fourth and Sixth Amendment rights were then
completed by the Military Order, which seeks to deny designated non-citizens any
Fifth Amendment rights aliens may have. In this way, derogations were introduced
that limit constitutional guarantees of free speech, protection from unreasonable
searches and seizures, and due process, as well as any protections offered by
international humanitarian law. Not all were necessarily intended to have indefinite
effect: the Patriot Act was to expire December 31, 2005, but the bulk of it was
made permanent in an only slightly improved form. 104 The Military Order was then
made permanent by the Military Commissions Act of 2006,105 in reaction to the
Supreme Court's ruling in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.
10 6
The Military Order contains a very broad, vague definition of delinquent or
deviant behavior subject to a state (in this case, military) response. Any non-citizen
the President has "reason to believe" has been, is or may in the future be involved
in "international terrorism" that will or is intended to negatively affect "the United
States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy" will be subject to
the order, provided this serves the interests of the United States.10 7 The Order
provides for trial by military commission of some individuals subject to the
order,' 0 8 but says nothing about what will be done with those who are not tried and
places no time limits on detention. 10 9 Indefinite preventive detention is therefore
possible, as Guantdnamo has shown. Moreover, due to its provision of exclusive
military commission jurisdiction and explicit denial of detainee recourse to "(i) any
court of the United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any court of any foreign nation,
or (iii) any international tribunal,"" 0 the Order places detainees in a "legal black
hole."11' Though this regime is not intended to constitute a derogatory criminal
103. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989). See also Majorie Cohn, The
Evisceration of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Wake of September 11, 2001, 71
FORDHAM L. REv. 1233 (2003).
104. See USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-177, 120
Stat. 195 (2006) (making permanent all but two of the sixteen provisions).
105. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
106. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) [hereinafter Hamdan].
107. Military Order, supra note 98, § 2(a).
108. Id. § 4(a).
109. Id. § 3.
110. Id. § 7(b)(2).
111. R (Abbasi & Another) v. Sec'y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs & See'y of
State for the Home Dep't, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1598, [22] (Eng.), [2003] UKHHR 76, 86
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procedure regime, it functions as one any time the president decides there is
"reason to believe" it is necessary. The possibility for arbitrary application of the
regime, the broad definition of conduct subject to the Military Order, the
establishment of military commissions and the provision for indefinite detention
are all hallmarks of the totalitarian criminal justice model.
By militarizing the struggle against terrorism, the executive usurped both
legislative and judicial power, a usurpation confirmed by the legislature in the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005112 and the Military Commissions Act. Both acts
entrench the exceptional regime and may be considered an illustration of the
weakened separation of powers typical of an institutionalized state of emergency.
Though some Supreme Court decisions invalidate certain aspects of this regime, 113
it nonetheless still stands. 1 4 This entrenchment moves the United States in the
direction of institutionalizing a state of emergency and toward a totalitarian model
of criminal justice.
In addition, Security Council resolutions adopted between 2001 and 2005
implicitly encourage the conflation between immigration, asylum and terrorism
and the adoption of repressive measures in these areas that contribute to an "us
versus them" mentality. Many states having derogatory regimes fitting the
authoritarian criminal justice model have thus also moved closer to the totalitarian
model under which terrorism is fought by repressing speech and excluding from
society individuals considered to be dangerous, either through criminal detention
or administrative measures designed to keep them beyond borders.
B. ... to a united (undeclared) state of emergency
Security and liberty have always been in tension, but September 11 tipped the
scales firmly in favor of security, as antiterrorism legislation that had been stalled
for months to years in various countries and at the European level were whisked
through the approval process. Just days after the attacks, Canada passed both an
(acknowledging that the plaintiff, a British citizen detained at Guantinamo, was in a "legal
black hole"). See also Lord Johan Steyn, Guant6namo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 1 (2004) (publishing Lord Johan Steyn's F.A. Mann Lecture, Nov. 25, 2003,
London). See also Amann, Guant6namo, supra note 99; George P. Fletcher, Black Hole in
Guantdnamo Bay, 2 J.I.C.J. 121 (2004).
112. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680 (2005).
113. See Hamdan, supra note 106.
114. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004);
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
8 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2010)
antiterrorism law that had been blocked for years due to likely conflicts with the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and harsh new immigration legislation
increasing detention powers and providing new reasons to reject asylum
applications.11 5 Similar "Patriot Acts"' 1 6 were passed in France and the United
Kingdom; the UK even took the extra step of declaring a state of emergency and
its intent to derogate from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR or
European Convention). 1 7 The European Union also took advantage of the post-
September 11 climate to adopt framework decisions that, like the Canadian
legislation, had long been under discussion but unable to gain acceptance.
Proclaimed "Europe's Response to 9/11," 1 8 the Framework Decisions on
Terrorism" 19 and the European Arrest Warrant' 20 cap years of effort by the Trevi
working group, established in 1976 to counter terrorisme, radicalisation,
extremisme and violence internationale.
Examining these developments and defining a state of emergency as the "hyper-
production of new law,"'121 Kim Lane Scheppele thus wrote in 2007 of an
undeclared international state of emergency resulting from the plethora of texts
adopted across the globe after 2001. This state of emergency was reinforced by
post-2001 terrorism-related Security Council resolutions. I will first discuss
conflicts between the international human rights and antiterrorism regimes before
examining the consequences in terms of specific measures in various countries
illustrating the axiological difficulty in extending ICC jurisdiction to terrorism.
1. Normative Conflicts and Security Council Resolutions
Conflicts between the human rights and antiterrorism regimes raise the issue of
normative hierarchy and, more specifically, whether Security Council resolutions
taken under Chapter VII relieve states of their human rights obligations.122 While
115. See Norberg, A Harmonized Approach, supra note 18, at 210-11.
116. Kim Lane Scheppele, Other People's PATRIOTActs: Europe's Responses to September 11,
50 LoY. L. REV. 89 (2004) [hereinafter Scheppele, Other People's Patriot Acts].
117. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR].
118. The name of a now nonexistent website.
119. Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism,
2002 O.J. (L 164) 3 (EC).
120. Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest
warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, 2002 O.J. (L 190) 1 (EC).
121. Scheppele, Memorandum to Syracuse Participants, supra note 12.
122. See Andrea Bianchi, Security Council's Anti-Terror Resolutions and Their Implementation
by Member States, 4 J.I.C.J. 1044 (2006) [hereinafter Bianchi, Security Council's Anti-
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Resolution 1373 does not grant states complete latitude to fight terrorism as they
will, it does contribute to their broadening their antiterrorism laws to include new
forms of conduct 123 and enables them to claim their repressive tactics are part of
the international struggle against terrorism.'
24
Resolutions 1373 and 1624 both implicitly give fighting terrorism precedence
over protecting human rights.125 Resolution 1373 contains no language recalling
states' human rights obligations and Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the first chairman of
the Counter-Terrorism Committee created to monitor compliance with the
resolution, initially made statements to the effect that making sure states continued
to meet their obligations under international human rights conventions while
implementing the resolution was beyond the Committee's mandate.
126
To correct the impression that the Security Council was not going to trouble
itself over human rights, subsequent resolutions remind states of their human rights
obligations. But Resolution 1624 generally gives human fights a back seat. It
begins by reaffirming "the imperative to combat terrorism ... by all means,
' 127
"[clondemning in the strongest terms all acts of terrorism [and] [c]ondemning also
in the strongest terms the incitement of terrorist acts . . ,,128 Only thereafter,
Terror Resolutions]. The Council of Europe continues to answer "no" to whether Security
Council resolutions under Chapter VII relieve states of their human rights obligations. In
January 2008, the Council's Parliamentary Assembly adopted a resolution with respect to
the "United Nations Security Council and European Union blacklists," the no-fly lists and
asset-freezing orders aimed at ending terrorist financing. The Assembly considers that "the
procedural and substantive standards currently applied by the UNSC and by the Council of
the European Union ... in no way fulfill [minimum procedural standards] and violate the
fundamental principles of human rights and the rule of law." EUR. CONSULT. ASS., United
Nations Security Council and European Union blacklists, 61st Sess., Res. 1597, 6 (2008),
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta08/ERES 1597.htm. The
European Court of Justice took a similar position in Kadi and Al Barakat International
Foundation v. Council, C-402/05 P, C-415/05 P, [2008] O.J. C 285/2.
123. Id. at 1051 (citing Law 2003-239 of March 18, 2003, Journal Officiel de la Rfpublique
Frangaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], March 19, 2003, p. 4769 [hereinafter Internal
Security Act] (adds article 421-2-3, "living from terrorism," to the Code Pnal; "the
inability to justify resources corresponding to one's lifestyle while maintaining habitual
relations with one or several persons engaging in one or more acts of terrorism.").
124. See, e.g., Mirko Sossai, The Internal Conflict in Colombia and the Fight Against Terrorism,
3 J.I.C.J. 253 (2005) (discussing the Colombian government's efforts to characterize its
internal conflict, which has been ongoing since 1948, as part of the international struggle
against terrorism, and the effect on the applicability of international humanitarian law of
applying international law with respect to terrorism to internal conflicts).
125. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 10; S.C. Res. 1624, supra note 11.
126. See Scheppele, Other People's PATRIOTActs, supra note 116, at 92-3.
127. S.C. Res. 1624, supra note 11, pmbl., 2 (emphasis added).
128. Id. pmbl., 3-4.
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"[d]eeply concerned that incitement of terrorist acts.., poses a serious and
growing danger to the enjoyment of human rights .... and emphasizing the need to
take all necessary and appropriate measures in accordance with international law at
the national and international level to protect the right to life,"'129 does the Council
recall the rights to freedom of expression and to seek and enjoy asylum. Though
this latter right is coupled with the obligation of non-refoulement, the same
sentence ends by "recalling" that persons suspected of committing "acts contrary
to the purposes and principles of the United Nations,"' 30 namely terrorism, do not
benefit from the protections offered by the Refugee Convention or its Protocol.
States are then called upon to prohibit inciting to terrorism, to refuse asylum to
persons reasonably suspected of doing so, and to tighten their borders., 3 It is then
"stressed" that states must comply with their human rights obligations, with no
apparent consequences if they do not (the Counter-Terrorism Committee is simply
directed to include states' efforts to implement this resolution in its "dialogue"
with them).132
Despite efforts by the General Assembly to reintroduce the notion of protecting
human rights while combating terrorism,' 33 the United Nations Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy 134 eliminates any lingering doubts about where priority lies. For
example, in the Action Plan set out in the Annex, the Member States resolve, inter
alia, to "consistently, unequivocally and strongly condemn terrorism in all its
forms and manifestations... as it constitutes one of the most serious threats to
international peace and security.' 35 The language includes domestic as well as
international terrorism and, perhaps not coincidentally, mirrors that of the ICC
11136
statute granting jurisdiction to the Court over "the most serious crimes ....
According to this Action Plan, one of the first "urgent action[s]" Member States
will take to "prevent and combat terrorism" is to "implement all General Assembly
resolutions on measures to eliminate international terrorism and relevant General
129. Id. pmbl., 5.
130. Id. pmbl., 7.
131. Id. 1-2.
132. Id. 4-6.
133. See Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the struggle against terrorism,
U.N. Doc. A/Res 57/219 (Dec. 18, 2002), U.N. Doc. A/Res 58/187 (Dec. 22, 2003), U.N.
Doc. A/Res 59/191 (Dec. 20, 2004), and U.N. Doc. A/Res 60/158 (Dec. 16, 2005).
134. Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, G.A. Res. 60/288, U.N. Doc. A/Res/60/288, Sept. 8,
2006.
135. Id. Annex, Plan of Action, 1.
136. ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 5, $ 1.
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Assembly resolutions on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
while countering terrorism."'' 37 The limitation to relevant GA resolutions
somewhat contradicts the document's preamble, in which all such resolutions are
recalled, but it is compatible with the ranking of Member States' obligations set
out in the preamble's fifth paragraph. Firstly, "world leaders rededicated
themselves to support all efforts to uphold the sovereign equality of all States,
respect their territorial integrity and political independence."' 38 These are of course
founding principles of the United Nations, and their primacy sets the logical order
for those that follow: non-recourse to the use of force and peaceful resolution of
disputes are second and third on the list, followed by the right to self-determination
and the principle of non-interference in other states' domestic affairs. "[R]espect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms" follows in sixth place; the principles
of non-discrimination, international cooperation and "the fulfillment in good faith
of the obligations assumed in accordance with the Charter" ' bring up the rear.
The emphasis on controlling immigration and asylum to prevent terrorism fuels
fear of foreigners and occults the fact that the terrorist threat is not strictly foreign
or international. The result is to strengthen measures having a disparate impact on
foreigners, particularly those from countries with large Muslim populations, and
even citizens of Arab or Muslim origin. 1
40
2. Combating Terrorism or Excluding the "Other"?
The Geneva Convention of 1951 on the Status of Refugees 14 1 entrenched what
at the time seemed a logical limit: the definition of "refugee" excludes individuals
reasonably suspected of having committed "a crime against peace, a war crime....
a crime against humanity, [or] a serious non-political crime142 outside the country
137. G.A. Res. 60/288, supra note 134, Annex, Plan of Action, 2(b) (emphasis added).
138. Id. pmbl., 5.
139. Id.
140. See Susan M. Akram & Martiza Karmely, Immigration and Constitutional Consequences of
Post-9/1l Policies Involving Arabs and Muslims in the United States: Is Alienage a
Distinction without a Difference?, 38 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 610 (2005) (concluding that post-
9/11 legislation changes did not target non-citizens suspected of terrorism in general, as the
executive branch claimed, but Arabs and Muslims, whether citizens or not). The French
designation issu(e)s dimmigration (resulting from immigration) is used predominantly to
denote first-generation French citizens of Arab or Muslim origin.
141. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 82.
142. That terrorism constitutes "a serious non-political crime" is confirmed by the extradition
clause in every international and regional terrorism convention. See Terrorist Financing
Convention, supra note 30, art. 14 ("None of the offences set forth in article 2 shall be
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of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee[, or] acts contrary to
the purposes and principles of the United Nations."' 143 Such persons are therefore
not protected by this convention against refoulement, even if they face torture in
their home countries. The Torture Convention144 tries to close this gap, as does the
European Convention as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR). 145 But since 2001, states have increasingly relied on so-called
"diplomatic assurances' ' 146 to circumvent the refoulement prohibition. This practice
is arguably encouraged by Resolution 1624 of 2005, which calls on states to
prohibit fomenting terrorism and to refuse asylum to persons reasonably believed
to do so. 147 This Resolution was not taken under Chapter VII, but by asking states
to report on their efforts in this area to the Counter-Terrorism Committee created
by Resolution 1373, it is implicitly given binding effect.
regarded for the purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance as a political offence or
as an offence connected with a political offence or as an offence inspired by political
motives."). As a result of the global ratification required by S/Res 1373, this exclusion now
applies in all UN Member States.
143. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 82, art. IF (a)-(c).
144. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987) (entered
into force for the United States on Nov. 20, 1994) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
145. See Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 37201/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47c6882e2.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2009)
(confirming Chahal v. Royaume-Uni, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831).
146. A diplomatic assurance is an agreement whereby the receiving states promises to treat
deported individuals humanely after their return. In Saadi and Chahal, the European Court
held that states cannot rely on diplomatic assurances in situations where there are serious
reasons to believe the expelled person runs the risk of torture or other ill treatment). See
Saadi, supra note 145; Chahal, supra note 145; Ashley Deeks, Introductory Note to
European Court of Human Rights Decision: Case of Saadi v. Italy, 47 ILM 542 (2008);
Fiona de Londras, Saadi v. Italy, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 616 (2008). See also Human Rights
Watch, Empty Promises: Diplomatic Assurances No Safeguard against Torture,
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2004/04/14/empty-promises; Khouzam v. United States, 549
F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2008) (concerning an Egyptian resident of the United States challenging a
deportation order on the grounds that he is at risk of torture despite diplomatic assurances
received from the Egyptian government). To resolve this dilemma, the European Union
introduced "subsidiary protection" through its Directive on minimum standards for
qualifying for refugee status. See Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on
minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless
persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the
content of the protection granted, 2004 O.J. (L 304) 12, 12-23 (EC). Subsidiary protection
constitutes an alternative regime designed to grant temporary protection to asylum seekers
who risk torture but do not satisfy the criteria for protection under the UN Refugee
Convention.
147. See S.C. Res 1624, supra note 11, 1.
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Exclusion of suspected terrorists from the definition of "refugee" was directed
at keeping out persons who had committed terrorist acts in their home states.
Today, it serves to bar passage to those feared to be seeking entry to commit
terrorist acts in their state of refuge. In either case, it fuels discourse on so-called
"false refugees"'148 and the conflation of asylum seekers, illegal immigrants and
terrorists. Consequently, terrorism has been fought largely with immigration law,
particularly since 2001: by keeping or ejecting suspected terrorists beyond national
borders, the territory is secured against the external threat. At the same time,
criminal provisions such as prolonged detention aim to preserve the nation from
the internal threat. As mentioned earlier, such detention excludes suspected
terrorists from society and contributes to the perception of them as "other." This
further fuels anti-immigrant sentiment and more draconian restrictions on
immigration and asylum. The post-2001 emphasis on combating "Islamic"'
49
terrorism has the double effect of excluding persons of Arab or Muslim origin
from society through both immigration and asylum laws and preventive criminal
measures.
The derogatory criminal procedure regimes instituted in many countries to
address serious forms of criminality, including terrorism, typically restrict access
to counsel and provide for a longer pre-charge custody period (i.e., police custody
prior to seeing a judge and being either charged or, in France, placed under
investigation) than that applicable under the normal regime. France instituted such
a regime in 1986 when it adopted its first anti-terrorism law in response to the
bombing of the Paris prefecture. A second law was passed in 1995 after a
commuter train was blown up at the Saint Michel station and explosive devices
were found in garbage cans around the city over the next several months. Between
November 2001 and January 2006, four more terrorism-related laws were passed:
the 2001 temporary law adopted in direct response to 9/11;1 5 a 2003 omnibus
measure rendering permanent all but one of the 2001 provisions; 151 the 2004
148. A discourse begun much earlier that resulted in the Schengen Acquis' institution, as of
1990, of heavy fines for air carriers for each "false refugee" brought into a country.
149. This term is at least reductionist as it conflates acts committed by fundamentalist groups of
varying beliefs for a variety of politico-religious reasons with the major religion with which
they share some beliefs and practices.
150. Law 2001-1062 of Nov. 15, 2001, Journal Officiel de la Rdpublique Franqaise [J.O.]
[Official Gazette of France], Nov. 16, 2003, p. 18215 [hereinafter Daily Security Act],
151. Internal Security Act, supra note 123 (called the Perben Act after the then-Interior Minister;
extends the derogatory procedural regime applicable to terrorism to organized crime and
drug trafficking).
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revision of this measure; 152 and the 2006 law relative to "the struggle against
terrorism and containing various provisions relating to border security and
controls."' 153 The 1986 law increased pre-charge custody from 24 hours renewable
one time in normal cases to 48 hours renewable one time in terrorism cases. The
2006 law increased this to a total of 144 hours, 154 or six days, while the normal
custody period is still limited to 48 hours maximum. In addition, suspects held
under the normal regime have a right to consult with counsel for thirty minutes as
soon as detention begins and again upon renewal, 55 whereas the 2004 and 2006
revisions result in terrorism suspects having no right to counsel until after 72 hours
of detention (or 96 if custody is extended to six days). Persons suspected of
organized crime, however, may consult with counsel after 48 hours. 156 The French
Constitutional Council (Conseil constitutionnel ) upheld these provisions on the
grounds that the right to life they protect outweighs the rights claimed to be
infringed. 1
57
Similarly, the Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure was revised in November
2003 to increase incommunicado detention of terrorism suspects from five to
thirteen days. 158 During this time, they are held in isolation and "represented" by
an appointed attorney (not of their choosing) who accompanies them to
interrogations and appearances before the judge but who may not address them
directly. 159
152. Law 2004-204 of Mar. 9, 2004, Journal Officiel de la Rdpublique Frangaise [J.O.] [Official
Gazette of France], Mar. 10, 2004, p. 4567 [hereinafter Adapting Justice to Changes in
Crime Act] (called Perben II).
153. Law 2006-64 of Jan. 23, 2006, Journal Officiel de la R~publique Frangaise [J.O.] [Official
Gazette of France], Jan. 24, 2006, p. 1129.
154. C. PR. PEN., art. 63-4.
155. Id. art. 63 & 63-4.
156. Id. art. 63-4 & 706-88.
157. See CC decision no. 2005-532DC, Jan. 19, 2006, Rec. 31. For a thorough analysis of French
counter-terrorism measures, see Constance Grewe & Ren~e Koering-Joulin, De la l4galitd
de 1 "infraction terroriste b la proportionnalit des mesures antiterroristes, in 2 LIBERTES,
JUSTICE, TOLtRANCE. MtLANGES EN HOMMAGE AU DOYEN GtRARD COHEN-JONATHAN
891 (2004).
158. L.E. Civ. 53/1978 (1978) (Spain) (amended by L.O.P.J. 13/2003 (2003) (referred to as
"Organic Law")).
159. See EUR. PARL. Ass., Report of the Comm. on Legal Affairs and Human Rights on the
Proposed 42-Day Pre-Charge Detention in the UK, 35th Sess., Doc. No. 11725 (2008),
available at http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/DocO8/EDOC 11725.htm.
See also Setting an Example? Counter-Terrorism Measures in Spain, 17 HUM. RTS.
WATCH 1 (2005), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/spain0105.pdf
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While there is no exceptional criminal procedure regime for terrorism in the
United States, 160 the material witness statute' 61 has been used successfully to
bypass the limits' 62 placed on police custody. For example, an appellate court
upheld a detention of several weeks even though no testimony was taken,' 63 and
many individuals, citizens as well as non-citizens, were detained as material
witnesses in the wake of 9/11 for periods of a few days to several months or even
longer. 164
The United Kingdom responded to the September 11 attacks by providing, inter
alia, for the unlimited detention of alien terrorism suspects.' 65 In December 2004,
the House of Lords held that the law was discriminatory, 166 but the Lords cannot
160. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, supra note 105 (creating an exceptional regime that
denies the protections of criminal due process to certain suspected terrorists by placing
them under military authority).
161. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2008) (providing for the arrest, pursuant to a warrant, of a person
believed to have information material to a criminal proceeding whose presence at trial may
not reasonably be assured).
162. Two forty-eight-hour post-arrest time limits apply to any arrest without a warrant. First, a
judge must make a determination of probable cause, which does not require presentation of
the detainee, within forty-eight consecutive hours. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113-4
(1975) ("[A] policeman's on-the-scene assessment of probable cause provides legal
justification for arresting a person suspected of crime, and for a brief period of detention to
take the administrative steps incident to arrest."); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500
U.S. 44 (1991) ("[A] jurisdiction that chooses to combine probable cause determinations
with other pretrial proceedings must do so as soon as is reasonably feasible, but in no event
later than 48 hours after arrest."). Second, arraignment must occur within forty-eight hours,
but the clock runs only while court is in session. Detainees are thus often held three to four
days before seeing a judge or being informed of the charges against them, or even, in many
cases, consulting counsel, as counsel is appointed at arraignment for those who so require.
See, e.g., ALAMEDA COUNTY OFFICE OF THE DIST. ATT'Y, POINT OF VIEW, POST ARREST
TIME LIMITS 5 (2003), available at
http://le.alcoda.org/publications/point of view/files/postarrestsummer2003.pdf ("A
defendant in custody must be arraigned within 48 hours of his arrest. Unlike the time limits
for probable cause determinations, the 48-hour countdown does not proceed nonstop.").
163. Awadallah v. United States, 349 F.3d 42, 75 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 861
(2005).
164. See, e.g., Steve Fainaru & Margot Williams, Material Witness Law has Many in Limbo,
THE WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 24, 2002, at AO1.
165. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, c. 24, § 23 (2001) (U.K.), available at
(http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts200l/20010024.htm) ("A suspected
international terrorist may be detained ... despite the fact that his removal or departure
from the United Kingdom is prevented (whether temporarily or indefinitely) .... ).
166. See A(FC) v. See y'of State for Home Dep't, [2004] UKHL 56 [731 (appeal taken from
EWCA) ("[S]ection 23 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 is incompatible
with articles 5 and 14 of the European Convention insofar as it is disproportionate and
permits detention of suspected international terrorists in a way that discriminates on the
ground of nationality or immigration status.").
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abrogate a law. It therefore remained in force-and the plaintiffs in detention-
until Parliament adopted replacement legislation. The Prevention of Terrorism Act
2005 overcomes the 2001 act's defects with respect to discrimination by extending
the indefinite detention provision to citizens as well as aliens.167 It also corrects
separation of powers problems by providing that such detention, transformed into
house arrest rather than incarceration, must be approved by a judge rather than
ordered by the Home Secretary. 168 However, individuals not subject to such
detention were subject to a fourteen-day pre-charge custody period. 169 Prime
Minister Tony Blair sought to have that period increased to ninety days, but had to
settle for twenty-eight in the Terrorism Act 2006. 170
Such provisions make a mockery of the 1988, Brogan v. UK,171 ruling by the
ECtHR that police custody lasting from four days and six hours to six days and
sixteen hours violates the right to "be brought promptly before a judge," as
guaranteed by Article 5 of the European Convention. Even Spain's original five-
day custody period and certainly its thirteen-day period, as well as France's six-
day custody period arguably violate the Convention as interpreted in Brogan.
Detention of this sort counters the presumption of innocence, weakens the link
between society and the detainee and may well contribute to the latter's
radicalization.'
72
In addition to flirting with violating arbitrary detention provisions, various
countries have shown open disregard for their obligation under the ICCPR, the
167. Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c. 2 §§ 5, 16(2)(a) (2005) (U.K.), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2005/pdf/ukpga_20050002_en.pdf (repealing § 23 of the
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 and permitting detention of any individual).
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See Terrorism Act 2006, c. 11, § 23 (2006) (U.K.), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/pdf/ukpga_20060011_en.pdf. Gordon Brown then
asked to double the detention period. The House of Commons approved a forty-two-day
pre-charge detention period. See UK. MPs Vote to Extend Pre-Charge Detention,
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Jun. 11, 2008, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-
and-updates/news/uk-mps-vote-extend-pre-charge-detention-200806 11. However, the
House of Lords rejected the extension. See Nicholas Watt, Brown Abandons 42-Day
Detention After Lords Defeat, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 13, 2008, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/oct/13/terrorism-uksecurityl.
171. Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 11209/84, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. [55], [62]
(1989), available at http://www.baiiii.orgeu/cases/ECHR/1988/24.html.
172. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LA JUSTICE COURT-CIRCUITtE. LES LOIS ET
PROCEDURES ANTITERRORISTES EN FRANCE at 80-83 (2008), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/france0708fr_l.pdf (Fr. version) and at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/france0708webwcover.pdf (Eng. version).
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Convention Against Terrorism and the ECHR not to deport or return aliens at risk
of torture.
In addition to excluding suspected terrorists from the definition of "refugee,"
the Refugee Convention denies its protections against expulsion to any refugee
reasonably "regard[ed] as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or
who, having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime,
constitutes a danger to the community of that country., 173 Persons reasonably
suspected of having committed terrorist acts prior to entering the state of refuge, or
who constitute a threat to the security of that country, are therefore subject to
expulsion or refoulement. But in the almost fifty years between the Refugee
Convention's entry into force and 2001, the right to be free from torture had come
to be recognized as ajus cogens norm: an absolutely protected right subject to no
derogations. 174 States Parties to the ICCPR, the European Convention and the
Torture Convention must not only refrain from committing acts of torture
themselves, they must also prevent torture by refraining from returning or
expelling a refugee to a country where s/he is in danger of being subjected to
torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment. 175 But the choice is not between
allowing persons suspected of having committed terrorist acts or otherwise posing
a security risk to roam free, on the one hand, and deporting them to face torture, on
the other. According to the terms of terrorism conventions' aut dedere, aut
judicare provisions, it is between extraditing and prosecuting terrorists found
within state territory. States should therefore investigate and prosecute if necessary
any individuals reasonably suspected of terrorism who cannot be returned.
176
Nonetheless, shortly after the Security Council emphasized in Resolution 1373
the need to prevent abuse of asylum, the Supreme Court of Canada validated the
return, despite the risk of torture, of a refugee whose ties to terrorism posed a
security risk to Canada. 177 Legislation implemented in Spain and Italy enables
these countries to take similar steps by providing for the expedited expulsion of
173. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 82, art. 33(2).
174. See ICCPR, supra note 91, art. 4(2); ECHR, supra note 117, art. 15(2); Convention Against
Torture, supra note 144, art. 2(2). See also MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, TOWARDS A
TRULY COMMON LAW: EUROPE AS A LABORATORY FOR LEGAL PLURALISM 129-130
(Naomi Norberg trans., Cambridge 2002) (1994).
175. See ICCPR, supra note 91, art. 7; ECHR, supra note 117, art. 3; Convention Against
Torture, supra note 144, art. 3(1).
176. See Bennoune, supra note 14, at 57.
177. Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Can.). See
Norberg, A Harmonized Approach, supra note 18, at 214-15.
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aliens administrative officials have at least "good reasons to believe" constitute a
security threat.' 78 Neither country's procedure provides adequate safeguards
against torture or inhuman or degrading treatment in the country of deportation; 
179
each may therefore lead to a violation of the prohibition against torture. Similarly,
between September 2001 and September 2006, French authorities forcibly
removed seventy-one individuals, including fifteen imams, "described as 'Islamic
fundamentalists' and suspected of ties to extremism and terrorism. 8' Such
national security removals are not new, but they now play an important role in
countering terrorism and other forms of violent extremism in France. Removal
procedures, however, do not provide adequate protection against torture or other
ill-treatment. 81
To avoid liability for a violation of the prohibition against torture, many states
have relied on so-called diplomatic assurances. 82 In a case against the UK in 1996
and again in a 2008 case against Italy in which the UK intervened, the ECtHR held
that where there are serious reasons to believe the person expelled runs a risk of
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, states may not so rely. 83 Still the UK
has persisted in concluding such safe-return agreements, particularly since, in the
wake of the July 2005 bombings, it adopted guidelines providing for the
deportation of any non-Briton "using any medium to 'foment, justify or glorify" 84
178. See Valery Grebennikov, Introductory memorandum, Respect for human rights in the fight
against terrorism, 60-3, Council of Europe Expert Committee on Terrorism
(CODEXTER), available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal affairs/legal co-
operation/fight againstterrorism/3_codexter/workingdocuments/2007/CODEXTER
(2007) 14 E PACE.pdf.
179. In Spain, persons subject to expedited expulsion have only 48 hours in which to challenge
the order; Italy's expedited orders are subject to immediate execution, which appeal does
not suspend.
180. Human Rights Watch, Letter to Members of the United Nations Human Rights Committee,
at 4 (June 17, 2008), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/HRWFrance93_170608.pdf. See also
LA JUSTICE COURT-CIRCUITEE, supra note 172.
181. See id.
182. Manfred Nowak, Special Rapporteur for the United Nations on Torture, criticized this
practice as reflecting "a tendency in Europe to circumvent the international obligation not to
deport" persons who are at risk of torture. See Norberg, A Harmonized Approach, supra
note 18, at 216.
183. Saadi, supra note 145. See also Chahal, supra note 145.
184. Scheppele, Other People's PATRIOT Acts, supra note 116, at 92-3. See Terrorism Act
2006, supra note 170, at § 12 (criminalizing "[t]respassing etc. on nuclear sites"). This
means that distributing pamphlets or otherwise encouraging or participating in anti-nuclear
protest actions such as the peace camp established by the women of Greenham Common in
the 1980s could be found to fall within the meaning of the act. If so, not only might non-
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terrorism. But once it was discovered that three of the individuals responsible for
the attacks had been born and raised in Britain, legislation was passed
criminalizing such behavior committed by Britons and non Britons alike.
In particular, the Terrorism Act 2006 establishes the rather vaguely and broadly
defined offenses of encouraging terrorism' 85 and disseminating "terrorist
publications."' 86 In this regard, the British law complies with the Council of
Europe's 2005 Terrorism Convention, which calls on states to criminalize "public
provocation to commit a terrorist offence." 187 France needed no encouragement in
this regard, as it criminalized public expression directly provoking or justifying
acts of terrorism in 1881.188 Since 2004, to the extent such expression constitutes
incitement "to discrimination, hatred or violence against a specific person or group
of persons,"'189 it has been grounds for deportation as well.
With tighter controls at the borders to keep aliens out and new deportation
criteria providing more grounds for expulsion, immigration law has become a
highly effective weapon in the struggle against international terrorism. The Bush
administration, for example, claimed progress in this struggle after expelling for
petty infractions unrelated to terrorism most of the over 700 individuals of Arab or
Muslim origin rounded up in the initial investigation into the September 11
attacks. 190 The Bush administration is not alone in this regard. The asylum-
immigration-terrorism link has been reinforced by post-2001 Security Council
resolutions and has led to a struggle against the "other," a struggle that bears no
relation to the responses implemented to combat genocide, crimes against
humanity or war crimes. Granting the ICC jurisdiction over terrorism would
implicitly condone such an approach, casting doubt on the legitimacy of that grant.
Britons be deported for such activity, but persons having engaged in similar activity in a
country like Pakistan could be denied asylum.
185. Id. § 1.
186. Id. § 2.
187. Council of Europe, Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism art. 5, May 16, 2005, CETS
No. 196, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/HtmU196.htm.
188. See Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la libertd de la presse [Law of July 29, 1881 for the Freedom
of the Press], arts. 23, 24.
189. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Le droit b la libertg d'expression, in Au nom de la
prevention. Des garanties insuffisantes concernant les dloignements pour des raisons de
srcurit6 nationale, http://hrw.org/french/reports/2007/france0607/5.htm#_Toc 16768623 1.
190. See Norberg, A Harmonized Approach, supra note 18, at 215.
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Conclusion
To be legitimate, a criminal statute must change something, it must be
proportional, and its application must be foreseeable. I have shown that terrorism is
the subject of inconsistent, competing definitions the application of which often
results from political expediency. While ICC jurisdiction to prosecute necessarily
means developing a consensus definition, application of such a definition is
lacking in foreseeability given the abundance of preceding, competing definitions
and entrenched national counter-terrorism regimes, as well as the political
concerns too often motivating the designation of individuals as terrorists. Because
the international crimes currently within the Court's jurisdiction originate in
international law, there is less discrepancy between the ICC and national
definitions; application of these norms is therefore sufficiently foreseeable.
Would ICC jurisdiction be proportional? If there were a consensus that
terrorism constitutes one of the "most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole," the answer would be "yes." But the inability to arrive at a
precise, consensus definition-particularly one that includes currently ignored
forms of terrorism91-as well the continued refusal of a major block of states to
consider acts committed during liberation struggles as terrorism indicate that such
consensus is lacking. Moreover, as I have shown with respect to Security Council
resolutions emphasizing the "imperative" of combating terrorism, elevating the
status of terrorism from internationalized to international crime may have the same
effect as these resolutions: to incite states to take increasingly harsh measures.
Many of these measures limit fundamental rights to an extent that may be
considered disproportional; in some cases they lead to violations of the prohibition
against torture. ICC jurisdiction could be interpreted as approval of such measures,
while, again, they have little in common with those taken to combat the crimes
already within its jurisdiction.
Would ICC jurisdiction change anything? Would it be effective? Here again,
with respect to the expressive function of criminal law, the answer might seem to
be "yes," as it would express solidarity with terrorism's countless victims. But here
again, the problem lies in determining just whose consensus is being expressed.
And there is also a problem with respect to deterrence. Former Chief Prosecutor
Richard Goldstone asserts that international criminal law proved to have at least
some deterrent effect: some war crimes were avoided and the indictment of
191. See supra notes 39 & 40 and accompanying text.
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Radovan Karad~i6 opened the door to the negotiations culminating in the Dayton
Accords. 192 But deterrence is linked to values: the less an individual shares the
values expressed by the norm or of the system producing it, the lower the norm's
deterrent effect. ICC jurisdiction would arguably have little to no deterrent effect
on much of contemporary terrorism, which is motivated by religious extremism.'
93
In this regard, the March 11, 2004 Madrid bombing had an unexpected effect:
Security Council Resolution 1566 of October 8, 2004 reintroduced the
preoccupation with underlying causes that had disappeared from General
Assembly resolutions in 1991. After reiterating the imperative of combating
terrorism and reminding Member States of their human rights obligations, the
Security Council
[e]mphasiz[ed] that enhancing dialogue and broadening the understanding among
civilizations, in an effort to prevent the indiscriminate targeting of different religions and
cultures, and addressing unresolved regional conflicts and the full range of global issues,
including development issues, will contribute to international cooperation, which by itself
is necessary to sustain the broadest possible fight against terrorism. 94
These are goals that international criminal law is ill equipped to meet. 195 In fact,
"courageous politics"' 96 are needed. A group of former heads of state and
government called the Club de Madrid released policy papers a year after the
bombing emphasizing that civil society has a significant role to play in combating
terrorism through cultural exchange. 97 The Club emphasizes the need to spread
democracy, but as Pippa Norris and Robert Inglehart show, "Islamic" terrorism
192. See Webcast video: Richard Goldstone, The Future of International Criminal Justice (U.N.
Dept. of Pub. Inform. 2008), http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ls/GoldstoneCLP.html.
193. But see Mgret, Justice in Times of Violence, supra note 7, at 34344 (arguing that the
criminal process, as opposed to military commissions, would serve criminal law's function
of rehabilitating terrorists and reintegrating them into society).
194. S.C. Res. 1566, 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004).
195. The problem is not limited to international criminal law. See Sunder, supra note 52, at
1413-15 (explaining that due to the Enlightenment separation of law (based on reason) from
religion, as well as cultural relativism (or the fear of it), human rights law has been unable
to "theorize change within cultural communities"). Law thus "defers to fundamentalist
claims to discriminate in the name of religion or culture, thwarting the claims of dissenting
women and other advocates of change." Id. at 1425.
196. Bennoune, supra note 14, at 58.
197. See Norberg, A Harmonized Approach, supra note 18, at 218. In particular, the Club
suggests citizens' networks to build democracy. It explicitly excludes non-governmental
organizations from this task, which are seen as imposing democracy from above or from
outside.
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expresses less disagreement with democracy than it does with gender equality. 198
Indeed, in the same way that "violence against women should be seen as a warning
sign for armed conflict," it should be seen as a warning sign for terrorism.'
99
"Groups that engage in these sorts of attacks on civilians as a whole often pursue
misogynist agendas and carry out, or advocate, severe forms of violence against
women."20 0 In addition, women's organizations often provide early warning of the
rise of such groups, as did Women Living Under Muslim Laws "since at least the
early 1990s" with respect to an "'Islamist international' with the organizational,
human, financial, and military means to threaten secularists, feminists and
democrats., 20 1 Bennoune therefore suggests that "[e]mpowering women [may
offer] a kind of counter-terror method that is antithetical to those based on human
rights abuses, like torture," and cites Valentine Moghadam, head of UNESCO's
gender unit, for the proposition that "[w]omen's peace movements in particular
constitute an important counter-movement to terrorism, and they should be
encouraged and funded.,
20 2
With respect to "courageous politics," studies by the Centre for the Study of
Global Governance at the London School of Economics indicate that 2003 was a
turning point in civil society relations between Islamic and western countries and
that a global civil society capable of bridging gaps and achieving some of the goals
203
set out in Resolution 1566 is emerging. Thus, just as civil society was largely
responsible for making the dream of an international criminal court a reality, so it
may be responsible for doing what law cannot do, and what ICC jurisdiction over
terrorism might undo.
In his study of litigation under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), Jaykumar Menon
suggests that its very existence might depend on grandeur: an action brought under
international law has greater moral force than one brought under domestic law.
20 4
198. See generally Pippa Norris & Ronald Inglehart, It's the Women, Stupid, MS. MAGAZINE,
Spring 2004.
199. Bennoune, supra note 14, at 49.
200. Id.
201. Id. (quoting Valentine Moghadam, Violence and Terrorism: Feminist Observations on
Islamist Movements, States and the International System, ALTERNATIVES: TURKISH J. INT'L
REL. (Summer 2002)).
202. Id.
203. See Yahia Said, Introduction in Civil Society in Iraq, GLOBAL CIV. Soc. Y.B. 2004/5
(Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor eds.), available at
http://www.Ise.ac.uk/Depts/globa/yearbook04chapters.htm.
204. Jaykumar A. Menon, The Alien Tort Statute: Blackstone and Criminal/Tort Law
Hybridities, 4 J.I.C.J. 372, 384-85 (2006).
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Thus, though the ATS grants only tort jurisdiction, defendants are tried not for
wrongful death or battery, but for summary execution or torture, for example.
Domestic prosecution for crimes against humanity, such as the French
prosecutions of Klaus Barbie, Paul Touvier and Maurice Papon, bears all the moral
weight associated with an international crime. Seeking to confer the status of
international crime on terrorism constitutes an understandable search to bring this
moral weight to bear on those responsible for terrorist acts. But it would not
necessarily deter them, nor bring justice to any more victims than is currently
available: since the ICC has no police force of its own, prosecution depends on
state cooperation. Prosecution of terrorism cases might therefore still be politically
biased.
In his lecture on the Future of International Criminal Law, Goldstone implicitly
205wnta
equates international criminal justice with war crimes. I have shown that
terrorism is fundamentally different from war crimes, genocide, and crimes against
humanity in terms of both its transnational, rather than international, nature, and
the ongoing state responses to it. Elevating terrorism to the rank of "crime of
crimes" would condone these responses, which since at least 2001, have
increasingly resulted in the violation of human rights and encouragement of an "us
versus them" attitude. ICC jurisdiction over terrorism would thus be counter to the
fundamental principles the Court aims to uphold, and would not be likely to fulfill
the goals of international criminal law.
Moreover, Goldstone cautions in his lecture that "[I]f you want to understand
international criminal justice, look at the politics. If you don't understand the
politics of these situations, you don't understand what's happening. ,2 06 Those
politics currently prevent agreement on an exception-free definition of terrorism
and consistent application of existing definitions.2 °7 If they succeed in extending
ICC jurisdiction to terrorism, they may succeed in proving international crimes to
be the "hoax" some suspect them of being: a reflection of "what the most powerful
states consider to be criminal, depending on their political and economic
interests .... "208
205. See Goldstone, supra note 192 (asserting that if the ICC fails, states will once again be able
to commit war crimes with impunity).
206. Id.
207. See Special Working Group on Crime of Aggression, supra note 74.
208. Fouchard, Crime international, supra note 19, at 31 (citing Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Quarante
ans de codification du droit de la responsabilit internationale des Etats. Un bilan, REVUE
GENtRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 342 (2003)).
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